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Climate Skepticism
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ABSTRACT
Much of the existing scholarship on climate change uses religiosity to
measure the effects of religion on climate skepticism and results in
inconsistent findings. Drawing on insights from the study of religion and
environmentalism more broadly, we suggest that scholars should seek a
deeper understanding of religion’s impacts by considering the influence of
specific religious beliefs on perceptions of climate change. We further
contend that researchers should consider how these factors shape
attitudes within and between segments of the public who hold varying
positions on climate change. We test these contentions using a novel
sample of 1,000 self-declared “climate skeptics” in the U.S. Pacific
Northwest. We find that, among skeptics, specific religious beliefs are
more strongly associated with a range of selected climate/environmental
attitudes (i.e., conspiracy ideation, trust in climate science, proenvironmentalism, emotions about climate change) than is religiosity. We
discuss these findings and their implications for future scholarship.
KEYWORDS
Climate skepticism, conspiracy ideation, perceptions of climate change,
pro-environmentalism, religiosity, religion
INTRODUCTION
Among scholarship on climate change, “religiosity” (often measured by
frequency of religious service attendance or self-identification as religious
in environmental work) is the preferred measure of religion’s impact on
climate skepticism. McCright (2016), for example, finds religiosity to be a
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weak or inconsistent predictor of climate skepticism. A brief look at the
literature confirms McCright’s contention. Some scholars find that
religiosity is a positive predictor of climate skepticism (Wang and Kim
2018; McCright and Dunlap 2011) while others show that religiosity has a
weak or moderating effect on people’s concerns about climate change
(McCright 2016; Zhou 2015) and still others find no correlation between
religiosity and concern about climate change (Kellstedt, Zahran, and
Vedlitz 2008).
This inconsistency also exists in literature on religiosity and
environmentalism more broadly. Kanagy and Nelsen (1995) find that
frequency of religious attendance is associated with a decrease in
environmentalism. However, Boyd (1999) finds no relationship between
these two variables while Kanagy and Willits (1993), Eckberg and Blocker
(1996), and Peifer, Khalsa, and Ecklund (2018) found a positive
relationship between frequency of church attendance and environmental
behavior.
Alternatively, religious scholars have turned to an examination of
specific religious beliefs (what we will call “religious ideation” in this
research note) to predict environmental attitudes and beliefs. Among the
beliefs scholars find associated with lower levels of environmentalism are
that of human dominion over earth (White 1967; Hand and Van Liere
1984; Eckberg and Blocker 1996; Tarakeshwar et al. 2001) and those
associated with Biblical end-times (Guth et al. 1995).
We contend that those who are interested in religion’s impacts on
climate skepticism should take note from the lessons of the broader
environmental scholarship and examine how skepticism manifests not
only in the context of religiosity but also in the context of specific religious
beliefs (e.g., beliefs in human dominion, beliefs in the Biblical end-times).
While the relationship between belief in human dominion and climate
change has yet to be investigated, scholarship does point to a significant
relationship between end-times theology and skepticism. For instance,
Barker and Bearce (2012) find that the end-of-days theology is associated
with greater skepticism surrounding climate change. They conclude that
the perception that the end-times are near shortens adherents’ perception
of the length of time in the future. Given they see no future to protect,
adherents resist pro-climate policy initiatives.
In this research note, we draw from prior theories in religion and
environmentalism to test the traditional mode of measuring religion’s
impact on skeptics, religiosity, which we measure by the frequency of
religious service attendance, against that suggested by extant scholarship
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as more robust, religious ideation, which we measure using several
specific religiously based beliefs about the environment (i.e., climate
change indicates God’s will, climate change is the end-of-days as
predicted in the Book of Revelation, climate change is punishment for our
sins, and humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature). We use a
unique dataset gathered from surveying 1,000 self-declared climate
change skeptics in the U.S. Pacific Northwest region, representing a range
of religious affiliations (Protestant, Christian, Catholic, Mormon, atheist or
agnostic, and other religions, as well as religiously unaffiliated), including a
majority of Christians (approximately 50 percent of the sample), and
examine the relative effects of religiosity and religious ideation on a series
of selected outcome measures: conspiracy ideation (i.e., skeptics’ belief
that climate change is a “hoax”), trust in climate science, proenvironmentalism, and emotion-based responses to climate change. We
suggest that climate skeptics are distinct from the general population with
regard to religion’s effects on conspiracy ideation, but similar along other
outcome measures. Methodologically, by demonstrating the relative
effects of religiosity and religious ideation on diverse outcome variables,
our findings suggest that religious ideation is a more useful variable for
empirical analysis of climate skepticism than religiosity. To affirm this,
future research should consider additional religious beliefs in their
analyses.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Below we examine the literature on both religiosity and religious ideation
as they relate to existing scholarship on climate skepticism. We further
explore their association with each of our outcome variables in turn:
conspiracy ideation, trust in science, environmentalism, and emotional
response to climate disasters.
Religiosity and Belief in Climate Change, Conspiracy Ideation, Trust in
Science, Environmentalism, and Emotion
As mentioned, religiosity is an inconsistent predictor of belief in climate
change. For example, McCright (2016) finds that religiosity is associated
with people’s denial that climate change is occurring but has no
relationship to one’s belief that it will have a negative impact, while
McCright and Dunlap (2011) and Wang and Kim (2018) find religiosity is a
positive predictor of climate change skepticism. In contrast, Kellstedt et al.
(2008) conclude that there is no relationship between religiosity and
climate skepticism.
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Scholarship on the intersection of conspiracies regarding climate
change and religion suggests that religiosity is positively correlated with
the belief that climate change is a hoax (Grzesiak-Feldman 2007; Galliford
and Furnham 2017; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, and Gignac 2013;
Sarathchandra and Haltinner 2020). In fact, this relationship is so powerful
among skeptics specifically, that Sarathchandra and Haltinner (2020) find
that for every one-degree increase in religiosity (as measured by religious
service attendance) among a sample of climate change skeptics, there is
a 12 percent increase in the likelihood one believes climate change is a
hoax.
Unlike climate change and conspiracy ideation, religiosity in the
United States is consistently, inversely correlated with scientific literacy
and trust in or perceptions of science. The more religious an individual, the
less likely they are to perceive science positively and trust scientific
information (McPhetres and Zuckerman 2018; Chan 2018). Religiosity is
also associated with negative views regarding scientific advances
(Bénabou, Ticchi, and Vindigni 2015; Scheufele et al. 2009).
Religiosity is not a consistent predictor of environmentalism.
Kanagy and Nelsen (1995), for example, found that an increase in church
attendance is correlated with greater willingness to sacrifice the
environment for economic gain. However, they found no relationship
between frequency of church attendance and self-identification as an
environmentalist. Boyd (1999) also found no relationship between
religiosity and environmentalism, using data from the General Social
Survey. In contrast, Eckberg and Blocker (1996) and Kanagy and Willits
(1993) find church attendance to be associated with pro-environmental
attitudes and individual behavior.
Despite these null and negative findings, Carlisle and Clark (2018)
find that frequency of religious attendance is negatively correlated with
support for government spending on environmental protection. Clements
McCright, and Xiao (2014) further complicate the understanding of
religiosity and environmentalism by demonstrating that church attendance
is positively associated with pro-environmental behaviors but negatively
associated with pro-environmental attitudes.
Existing research on affect and climate change has not yet
considered the role religiosity has on these experiences. However,
research on religiosity more broadly shows that it is generally correlated
with emotional well-being (George, Ellison, and Larson 2002). Scholars
posit that, at least in part, the positive impact of religion on emotional wellbeing is a result of the community formed religious engagement

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol37/iss3/1

4

Haltinner and Sarathchandra: Beyond Religiosity

(Zinnbauer and Pargament 2002). The more integrated someone is in
their religious community, the greater the emotional benefits (Krause and
Hayward 2013; Strawbridge et al. 2001). Studies that focus on religion’s
impact on long-term existential fears, such as death, find that religion – in
this case Christianity – seems to moderate fear of death wherein the more
people attend church activities, the less they experience death anxiety
(Feifel and Nagy 1981). This scholarship suggests that religiosity may
mitigate some strong emotions such as fear and dread which has
implications for emotion-based responses to environmental and climate
disasters.
Religious Ideation and Belief in Climate Change, Conspiracy Ideation,
Trust in Science, Environmentalism, and Emotion
As mentioned, scholarship that examines the relationship between specific
religious beliefs and climate skepticism is less common but seem to show
more consistent results than religiosity. Beliefs that the Bible is the literal
word of God and in end-of-days theology are associated with greater
rejection of climate science (Haluza-Delay 2014; Barker and Bearce
2012). However, an exception arises in the case of Latter-day Saints who
are more likely than mainline Christians to believe in end-of-days theology
yet do not differ significantly with regard to their perspectives on climate
change (Haltinner and Sarathchandra 2020).
Similarly, scholarship on the relationship between religiosity and
adherence to conspiracy theories has produced mixed results. Some find
that, when combined with other demographic variables, religiosity is
inversely correlated with belief in conspiracies (Freeman and Bentall 2017;
Furnham 2013; Lobato et al. 2014) while others suggest a positive
correlation between religiosity and acceptance of conspiracies that are in
line with underlying religious ideologies (Oliver and Wood 2014). For
example, Christians are more likely to adhere to political or medical
conspiracies than are members of other religious groups (Galliford and
Furnham 2017).
While a majority of prior research that examines the association
between religious affinity and science trust operationalizes religion in
terms of religious sect and religiosity (e.g., frequency of religious
attendance, frequency of prayer, etc.), a few studies have also looked at
specific religious beliefs. For example, Jelen and Lockett (2014) find that
belief in the authority of the Bible leads to higher general skepticism
toward controversial science topics, including global warming.
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The most famous theory with regard to religious beliefs and
environmentalism is known as the “Lynn White Thesis.” White argued that
Biblical beliefs regarding human dominion caused adherents to reject
environmental protection (1967). In support of White’s thesis, Eckberg and
Blocker (1996) find that both belief in human dominion and Biblical
literalism more generally is associated with lower support for
environmental policies and individual actions. Further, Barker and Bearce
(2012) find that those who believe in “Christian end-times theology are
less likely to support policies designed to curb global warming” as
compared to other Christians in the United States (267). They conclude
that the perception that the world will end soon decreases one’s
perspective of the possible length of future. Thereby, those who adhere to
end-of-day theology are more likely to support policies beneficial in the
short term than over an extended period of time. In contrast, Boyd (1999)
finds no relationship between the literal interpretation of the Bible and
environmental views.
There is a dearth of literature at the intersection of affect, religious
ideology, and climate skepticism. Therefore, we seek to rely on broader
scholarship on the impact of religion on emotions. In examining specific
religious beliefs and emotions we were unable to find work directly
connected to the belief in human dominion or end-times theology. Work on
the relationship between Biblical literalism more broadly suggests that
certain beliefs do affect one’s emotional state; belief in “divine forgiveness”
is correlated with lower levels of anxiety, while the perception that people
are “basically evil” is associated with higher anxiety (Flannelly 2017).
Our Contribution
Our research note extends past scholarship in important ways. First, we
use a unique data set gathered from climate skeptics rather than the
general population. This allows us to explore the nuances of climate
skepticism at greater depth than data sets that include people with
different perspectives on climate change. Second, we examine the effects
of (1) the frequency of religious service attendance (“religiosity”) and (2)
specific religious beliefs that intersect with climate change (what we call
“religious ideation” including the “belief in human dominion”) on the nature
of climate change skepticism. This allows us to both determine which
variable is more useful to the analysis of climate skepticism and to
understand how religious affinity and its various manifestations impact
climate science skepticism, adding important inroads into scholarly
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understandings of the role of religion in shaping perceptions of climate
change.
Drawing from extant literature on religion and climate change
skepticism, we test a series of hypotheses. In particular, based on the
prior literature discussed above, we expect that when examining the
relative effects of religiosity and religious beliefs on climate skepticism:
H1: Among climate skeptics, specific religious beliefs (religious
ideation and/or belief in human dominion) will have a stronger positive
effect on the belief that climate change is a hoax (i.e., conspiracy ideation)
than religiosity.
H2: Among climate skeptics, specific religious beliefs (religious
ideation and/or belief in human dominion) will have a stronger negative
effect on trust in climate science than religiosity.
H3: Among climate skeptics, specific religious beliefs (religious
ideation and/or belief in human dominion) will have a stronger negative
effect on environmental concern and support for pro-environmental policy
than religiosity.
H4: Among climate skeptics, specific religious beliefs (religious
ideation and/or belief in human dominion) will lower the intensity of
emotion-based reactions to climate change more than religiosity.
METHODS
Data Collection
For this study we conducted an online survey of adult climate change
skeptics living in Idaho, Washington, and Oregon. The survey was
distributed via Qualtrics, a firm that specializes in representative online
surveys. The University of Idaho Institutional Review Board approved the
survey procedure before data collection began. Our final survey sample,
representative of U.S. census data for gender and education, consists of
1,000 complete responses.1
To identify respondents who are skeptical of climate change we
used two screening questions, asking whether respondents believe: “(1)
“climate change is happening” and (2) “climate change is caused by
human activities” (response categories: yes=1; no=2; not sure=3).
Respondents who said that they believed climate change was happening
and it was caused by human activities were screened out using a
Qualtrics filter which prevented this group from taking the survey. This
limited our final sample (N=1,000) to those who expressed uncertainty
regarding the realities and anthropogenic causes of climate change (i.e.,
climate skeptics). Skeptics identified using this screening procedure then
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proceeded to answer our full survey, which consisted of 45 questions on
their climate/environmental beliefs, related attitudes, and
sociodemographic characteristics.
Key Independent Variables
Our study consists of three main independent variables measuring specific
religious beliefs (termed “religious ideation” and “belief in human
dominion”) and religiosity. We developed these measures using factor
analysis as described below and operationalized as follows:
I. Religious ideation: We measured religious ideation by creating a 3item scale that captures participants’ intersecting beliefs about
climate change and religion: “Climate change indicates God’s will,”
“Climate change is the end-of-days as predicted in the Book of
Revelation,” and “Climate change is punishment for our sins.”
Participants responded on a Likert scale where “strongly
disagree”=1 to “strongly agree”=7 (Cronbach’s α=0.78).
II. Belief in human dominion: We measured belief in human dominion
by using the item “Humans were meant to rule over the rest of
nature.” Participants responded on a Likert scale from “strongly
disagree”=1 to “strongly agree”=7.
III. Religiosity: We measured religiosity by asking respondents how
often they attend religious services, with response categories
ranging from never (1) to more than once a week (7). Frequency of
religious attendance is a popular measure of religiosity in
environmental sociology and studies of climate skepticism (e.g.,
Ecklund et al 2017; McCright and Dunlap 2011).
While we used a single-item ordinal scale to measure religiosity, for
religious beliefs, we ran a principal component analysis (PCA) with
Varimax rotation on four religious belief items from our survey. Three
items loaded on Factor 1 constituting our religious ideation scale. We treat
the remaining item, “belief in human dominion,” as a single-item belief
measure (See Table 1 for item wording and frequency distributions for all
four religious belief items.) It is important to note here that due to issues
with multicollinearity, we do not consider religious sect as a measure of
religious affinity in the current study.
Dependent Variables
Our study consists of several outcome variables: conspiracy ideation,
(dis)trust in climate science, environmental concern, pro-environmental
policy support, and four key emotion-based responses to climate change,
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as well as several key predictors and controls that are informed by
relevant prior literature.
Table 1: Religious Belief Items (Percentage Distributions, N=1,000)
Item
Disagree Neutral
Agree
Climate change indicates God’s will
49.0%
33.1%
17.9%
Climate change is end-of-days as
predicted in the Book of Revelation
Climate change is punishment for our
sins
Humans were meant to rule over the
rest of nature

57.7%

29.4%

12.9%

70.3%

21.1%

8.6%

28.8%

31.8%

39.4%

The first main outcome – conspiracy ideation – is measured using
responses to the question “Do you think climate change is a hoax?” with
three response categories: yes=1, no=2, not sure=3. We treat conspiracy
ideation as a dummy variable (yes=1 and no/not sure=0). This is an
important outcome measure to consider as prior work suggests that about
a quarter of climate change skeptics in the U.S. explicitly endorses the
belief that climate change is a hoax (Sarathchandra and Haltinner 2020).
Accordingly, skeptics who adhere to this belief are more likely to be older,
politically conservative, more educated, more religious, and
disproportionately men, compared to non-conspiracy adhering
counterparts. In our sample, 24.5 percent of respondents agreed that
climate change is a hoax. Further investigation of this belief and its
potential connections to religion is important given that both are rooted in
ideological belief systems (Haltinner and Sarathchandra 2021a).
Second, (dis)trust in science is a 14-item, validated scale,
measuring distrust in climate science and scientists created using principal
component analysis (PCA) and Cronbach’s alpha (α=0.93)
(Sarathchandra and Haltinner 2021). Participants expressed whether they
agree on the items using a 1-7 Likert scale where “strongly disagree”=1 to
“strongly agree”=7.
Third, environmental concern is a 16-item scale that measures
respondent’s average environmental concern, created using PCA and
Cronbach’s alpha (α=.96) (Haltinner and Sarathchandra 2020). Items were
rank ordered on a 1-7 Likert scale where “not at all concerned”=1 to “very
concerned”=7. See Table SM1 for survey item wording and descriptive
statistics.
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Fourth, pro-environmental policy support is a 13-item scale created
to measure the average support for pro-environmental policy initiatives
among climate skeptics. Survey items ranged from support for
investments in solar and wind energy, and government regulations for air
and water pollution, to public school curriculums including issues related
to the environment and human caused climate change. Three items
(expanding offshore drilling, cutting funding for the EPA, and withdrawing
from the Paris Climate Treaty) were reverse coded so that higher values
indicate more support. Participants expressed their support on a 1-7 Likert
scale where “not at all support”=1 to “support a great deal”=7 (Cronbach’s
α=.87). See Table SM2 for survey item wording and descriptive statistics.
Finally, to measure emotion-based responses to climate change we
asked our survey participants to indicate the extent to which they feel the
following emotions when thinking about climate change: worry, dread,
sadness, and grief (“While thinking about the concept of climate change,
to what extent do you feel the following emotions?”). Participants
expressed their degree of emotional responses on a 1-7 Likert scale
where “not at all”=1 to “an extreme amount”=7. In our analytical models
below we treat worry, dread, sadness, and grief as four discrete emotions,
building on prior research on climate change emotions which employ
similar discrete emotion scales (e.g., Haltinner, Ladino, and
Sarathchandra 2021).
Other Covariates and Analytical Strategies
Our analysis also employs several other key theoretically informed
predictors and control variables (Table 2). Political ideology is measured
on a 7-point scale from very liberal (1) to very conservative (7), and
gender is measured as men=1 and women/other=0. Age is measured with
eight categories: 18-19=1 to 80 or older=8. Income is measured with five
categories: $0-$24,999=1 to $100,000 and above=5. Education is
measured by the highest degree earned: less than high school diploma or
equivalent=1 to doctoral degree=8. See Table 2 for these measures and
associated frequency distributions.
We first examined frequency distributions and descriptive statistics
for our outcome, predictor, and control variables. We then ran regression
diagnostics and multicollinearity tests. Subsequently we used a series of
multivariate linear regressions and logistic regressions to examine the
extent to which religiosity and specific religious beliefs affect our outcome
variables, i.e. conspiracy ideation, distrust in climate science, proenvironmentalism and emotion-based responses among climate skeptics
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(while controlling for relevant socio-demographic variables). All models
reported use the same covariates. Analyses was performed with IBM
SPSS 24.
FINDINGS
Sample Characteristics
While 49 percent of participants in our sample identified as men, 49.9
percent identified as women and 1.1 percent identified as neither men nor
women. Eighty-nine percent identified as white, 4.7 percent as Asian, 3.8
percent as Native American, 2.7 percent as Black, 1 percent as Native
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, and 0.6 percent as Arab-American. The
remaining participants identified as another race. Twenty percent of
participants were younger than 30. Twenty-five percent were between 30
and 49; 35 percent between 50-69, and 20 percent were older than 70.
Our participants came from a variety of political, educational, and
economic backgrounds. Approximately 42 percent identified as slightly to
very conservative, 42.6 percent as moderate, and 15.6 percent as slightly
to very liberal. Thirty-one percent of our respondents had no college
education, 30 percent had some college or an Associate’s degree, 20
percent had a Bachelor’s degree, and 19 percent had advanced degrees.
Fifty-three percent of our participants earned less than $50,000 in total
annual household income, 29 percent earned between $50,000 and
$100,000, while 18 percent earned over $100,000 annually. See Table 2
for a summary of sociodemographic variables, with mean and standard
deviations reported for items included in the regression analyses in
continuous form.
In terms of religion, a majority of participants in our sample selected
the “none” category as their religious affiliation. Nearly 20 percent
identified as mainline Protestant, 18.1 percent as evangelical Christian,
12.6 percent as Catholic, and 4.4 percent as Mormon. While 8.6 percent
of our respondents identified as atheist or agnostic, 13 percent identified
with other religions.
Further, approximately 42 percent of our participants indicated that
they “never” attend religious services, 17 percent stated that they attend
religious services “more than once a week,” 12 percent attend religious
services “about once a year,” while another 12 percent attend these
services “a few times a year.” In terms of our three “religious ideation”
measures, approximately 18 percent of respondents in our sample agreed
“climate change indicates God’s will,” 13 percent agreed “climate change
is the end-of-days as predicted in the Book of Revelation,” and 9 percent
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agreed “climate change is punishment for our sins” (Table 1). While 39.4
percent of respondents agreed that humans were meant to rule over the
rest of nature, 28.8 percent disagreed with this statement, and 31.8
percent neither agreed nor disagreed.
Table 2: Sociodemographic Characteristics
Full Sample
Mean (SD)
% (Frequency)
(N=1,000)

Characteristic
Gender
Women
Men
Not reported
Political ideology (very liberal=1 to very conservative=7)
Age (18-19=1 to >80=8)
Education (less than high school diploma or
equivalent=1 to doctoral degree=8)
Race
White
Non-white
Income ($0-$24,999=1 to $100,000 and above=5)
Religiosity (never attend religious services=1 to attend
services more than once a week=7)
Religion
Evangelical Christian
Catholic
Mormon
Mainline Protestant
Atheist/Agnostic
None
Other
Religious ideation (strongly disagree=1 to strongly
agree=7)
Belief in human dominion (strongly disagree=1 to
strongly agree=7)

49.9% (499)
49.0% (490)
1.1% (11)
4.5 (1.50)
4.5 (2.04)
3.7 (1.83)

89.0%
11.0%
2.7 (1.41)
3.0 (2.19)

18.1% (181)
12.6% (126)
4.4% (44)
19.1% (191)
8.6% (86)
24.2% (242)
13.0% (130)
2.8 (1.38)
4.2 (1.73)

Conspiracy Ideation
When examining the effects of religion on conspiracy ideation (the
likelihood of endorsing the belief that climate change constitutes a “hoax”),
we find that religiosity is associated with a higher likelihood of conspiracy
ideation, but with a small positive effect (B=0.08, p<.05). In contrast, the
relationship between religious ideation and conspiracy ideation is not
significant. However, belief in human dominion does emerge as a
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statistically significant predictor with a comparatively stronger positive
effect on the outcome measure (B=0.15, p<.01) holding constant religious
ideation, religiosity, and other pertinent socio-demographic variables. In
fact, every one-degree increase of human dominion belief is associated
with a 1.16 times higher likelihood of adhering to a climate change
conspiracy. Results indicating a potentially stronger effect of the belief in
human dominion over religiosity provides some support for our first
hypothesis (H1) (Table 3).
Table 3: Binary Logistic Regression Explaining Conspiracy Ideation
95% CI for
Predictors
B
SE
Exp(B)
Exp(B)
Religiosity
0.08
0.04
1.08
1.03 – 1.17
(p=.040)
Religious ideation
-0.02
0.06
0.98
0.87 – 1.11
(p=.753)
Belief in human
0.15
0.05
1.16
1.05 – 1.29
dominion
(p=.005)
Liberal-conservative
0.46
0.06
1.58
1.40 – 1.78
ideology
(p<.001)
Age
0.02
0.05
1.02
0.93 – 1.12
(p=.690)
Gender (men=1)
0.58
0.17
1.78
1.28 – 2.46
(p<.001)
Education
0.11
0.05
1.12
1.02 – 1.23
(p=.051)
Race (white=1)
0.10
0.28
1.11
0.97 – 1.30
(p=.714)
Constant
-5.10
-2 Log likelihood
956.65
Nagelkerke R-square
21.6%
N
1,000
Trust in Climate Science
There is no significant relationship between religiosity and trust in climate
science among climate change skeptics in our sample. However, we do
see that religious ideation leads to a small positive effect on distrust
(B=0.08, p=.001) while belief in human dominion emerges as a statistically
significant predictor with a comparatively larger effect (B=0.14, p<.001),
when controlling for religiosity and other relevant and theoretically
important covariates such as political ideology, gender, race, education
and age (Table 4 – Model 1). Results also show that, among skeptics,
men and those who are politically conservative are more likely to be
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distrustful of science, consistent with prior literature (Sarathchandra and
Haltinner 2021). Overall, this model explains approximately 21 percent of
the variability in our outcome measure, distrust in science.
Contrary to prior work that shows negative effects of religiosity on
trust in science (McPhetres and Zuckerman 2018; Chan 2018), we did not
find a significant effect of religiosity when accounting for potential effects
of religious ideation and human dominion. These results further suggest
that climate skeptics potentially behave differently than the broader public.
They also suggest the value of taking specific religious beliefs (beyond
religiosity) into consideration when examining how religion manifests in
climate skepticism.
Our findings show that even when frequency of religious
attendance and other theoretical predictors of climate skepticism are held
constant, the underlying specific beliefs related to climate change (e.g.,
climate change indicates God’s will, is punishment for our sins, or is a sign
of the end-of-days) do affect skeptics’ trust in climate science. This
extends existing scholarship that looks at other religious beliefs (belief in
biblical authority, Jelen and Lockett 2014) and suggests there is important
nuance to discover in the relationship between religious beliefs and
scientific trust.
Pro-Environmentalism
Our analysis also examined the effects of the above religion measures on
two measures of pro-environmentalism: environmental concern (Table 4 –
Model 2) and pro-environmental policy support (Table 4 – Model 3).
Neither religiosity nor religious ideation have significant effects on
environmental concern when controlled for other theoretically important
predictors of environmental views and climate skepticism. Rather, political
ideology (conservatism) (B=-0.11, p<.001), gender (men) (B=-0.35,
p<.001), and education (B=0.06, p<.05) emerge as significant predictors of
environmental concern among climate skeptics. The only religion measure
that emerges as a statistically significant predictor of environmental
concern is the belief in human dominion (B=-0.07, p=.011) with a small
negative effect of this belief on concern for the environment.
However, with regard to pro-environmental policy support, belief in
human dominion and religious ideation both have small negative effects
(B=-0.07, p<.01 and B=-0.08, p<.05) while religiosity was not a significant
predictor of environmental policy support (Table 4 – Model 3). Political
ideology (conservatism) (B=-0.21, p<.001) and education (B=0.12,
p<.001) also emerge as significant predictors of policy support among
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climate skeptics. These findings are largely in line with our hypothesis 2
and 3 (H2 and H3): specific religious beliefs (religious ideation and/or
belief in human dominion) are more pertinent and have a stronger
negative effect on trust in climate science and pro-environmentalism
compared to religiosity. Overall, the models for environmental concern and
pro-environmental policy support only account for approximately 6 percent
and 9 percent of the variability in the respective outcomes, much lower
than that for distrust in science reported above (21 percent).
Table 4: Unstandardized Coefficients from OLS Regression Models Explaining
Distrust in Science, Environmental Concern, and Pro-environmental Policy
Support
Predictors

Religiosity
Religious
ideation
Belief in
human
dominion
Liberalconservative
ideology
Age
Gender
(men=1)
Education
Race
(white=1)
F
Sig.
Adjusted R2
N

Model 1
Distrust in science

Model 2
Model 3
Environmental
Pro-environmental
concern
policy support
B
95% CI
B
95% CI
-0.02
-0.07 – 0.02
0.01
-0.04 – 0.05
(p=.272)
(p=.780)
-0.03
-0.09 – 0.04
-0.08
-0.14 – -0.01
(p=.422)
(p=.027)
-0.07
-0.12 – -0.01
-0.07
-0.12 – -0.01
(p=.011)
(p=.008)

B
0.01
(p=.742)
0.08
(p=.001)
0.14
(p<.001)

95% CI
-0.02 – 0.04

0.20
(p<.001)

0.16 – 0.24

-0.11
(p<.001)

-0.17 – -0.05

0.02
(p=.156)
0.25
(p<.001)
0.03
(p=.130)
0.04
(p=.667)

-0.01 – 0.06

0.04
(p=.092)
-0.35
(p<.001)
0.06
(p=.013)
-0.24
(p=.089)

-0.01 – 0.09

0.03 – 0.13
0.09 – 0.17

0.13 – 0.37
-0.01 – 0.06
-0.15 – 0.24

35.00
<.001
21.4%
999

-0.21
(p<.001)

-0.27 – -0.15

0.05
(p=.058)
-0.52 – -0.18
-0.12
(p=.180)
0.01 – 0.12
0.12
(p<.001)
-0.51 – 0.04
0.04
(p=.758)
7.51
<.001
6.1%
999

-0.00 – 0.09
-0.30 – 0.06
0.06 – 0.17
-0.24 – 0.32
12.07
<.001
9.5%
999

Emotions Related to Climate Change
Our analysis also considered four emotion-based reactions to climate
change and how they are associated with religion (Table 5). We find that
religiosity has no effect on worry, dread, sadness, and grief related to
climate change when holding constant specific religious beliefs and other
theoretically important covariates. Religious ideation has a positive effect
on dread (B=0.10, p<.01) as well as sadness (B=0.09, p<.05) and grief
(B=0.12, p=.001) – the higher the degree of religious ideation, the higher
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the degree of experiencing these emotional states related to climate
change. On the other hand, belief in human dominion has a small negative
effect on all four emotional states we tested for, such that those who
believe humans are meant to rule over nature are less likely to experience
worry, dread, sadness, or grief related to climate change (H4). As far as
other variables in the models are concerned, we find that conservative
political ideology and age lowers emotion-based reactions to climate
change, and men are less likely to experience these negative emotional
states in comparison to women and people who do not identify as men or
women. Overall, our religion-based models for worry, dread, sadness, and
grief explain roughly 10 percent to 15 percent of the variability in the said
emotion states related to climate change.
It is worth noting that, taken together, our linear regression models
have adjusted R-squared values ranging from 6.1 percent to 21.4 percent
(Tables 4 and 5). While some of these R-squared values are low, given
the models include theoretically pertinent covariates and test relative
effects of religion using three different constructs of religion, we find the
overall results across models to be substantively compelling, which we
turn to below.
DISCUSSION
Our analysis presents important findings with regard to the way that both
religiosity and religious beliefs interact with factors such as conspiracy
ideation, demographic variables, pro-environmentalism, emotional
responses to climate change, and trust in science among climate change
skeptics. Overall, we find that while religiosity is positively associated with
the belief that climate change is a hoax, it is not associated with trust in
science, pro-environmentalism, or emotions related to climate change. In
contrast, religious beliefs (religious ideation and belief in human dominion)
are significant predictors of conspiracy ideation, trust in science, proenvironmentalism, and emotional states related to climate change.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol37/iss3/1

16

Haltinner and Sarathchandra: Beyond Religiosity

Table 5: Unstandardized Coefficients from OLS Regression Models Explaining Emotion-based Reactions to Climate
Change
Predictors
Religiosity
Religious ideation
Belief in human
dominion
Liberalconservative
Age
Gender (men=1)
Education
Race (white=1)
F
Sig.
Adjusted R2
N

Published by eGrove, 2022

Worry
Dread
B
95% CI
B
95% CI
0.02
-0.02 – 0.07
0.05
0.01 –0.09
(p=.341)
(p=.049)
0.06
-0.01 – 0.14
0.10
0.03 – 0.17
(p=.094)
(p=.008)
-0.09
-0.15 – -0.02 -0.09
-0.14 – -0.02
(p=.006)
(p=.007)
-0.26
-0.33 – -0.19 -0.24
-0.33 – -0.19
(p<.001)
(p<.001)
-0.15
-0.20 – -0.09 -0.13
-0.18 – -0.07
(p=.002)
(p<.001)
-0.28
-0.47 – -0.08 -0.23
-0.43 – -0.04
(p=.005)
(p.011)
0.04
-0.02 – 0.09
0.01
-0.05 – 0.06
(p=.228)
(p=.786)
-0.11
-0.42 – 0.19
0.16
-0.14 – 0.47
(p=.471)
(p=.298)
22.26
19.43
0.000
0.000
14.5%
12.9%
999
999

17

Sadness
B
95% CI
0.03
-0.02 – 0.08
(p=.211)
0.09
0.01 – 0.17
(p=.022)
-0.10
-0.16 – -0.03
(p=.004)
-0.25
-0.33 – -0.19
(p<.001)
-0.07
-0.13 – -0.02
(p=.010)
-0.33
-0.53 – -0.12
(p=.002)
0.01
-0.05 – 0.07
(p.800)
0.03
-0.29 – 0.35
(p=.870)
15.34
0.000
10.3%
999

B
0.04
(p=.105)
0.12
(p=.001)
-0.09
(p=.005)
-0.20
(p<.001)
-0.12
(p<.001)
-0.16
(p=.113)
0.01
(p=.819)
0.01
(p=.928)

Grief
95% CI
-0.01 – 0.09
0.05 – 0.19
-0.14 – -0.02
-0.27 – -0.13
-0.17 – -0.06
-0.35 – 0.04
-0.05 – 0.06
-0.29 – 0.32
15.34
0.000
10.3%
999
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Our findings regarding religiosity and conspiracy ideation extend
existing scholarship which suggests that attending religious events is
inversely correlated with conspiracy ideation (Freeman and Bentall 2017;
Furnham 2013; Lobato et al. 2014). Our findings show that, among climate
skeptics, as religiosity increases – regardless of their specific religious
beliefs – so too does one’s likelihood to belief that climate change is a
hoax.
This finding could be explained by our unique population of climate
skeptics. It could be the case that, as McCright and Dunlap (2011) find,
skeptics already have higher than average levels of religiosity and,
therefore, the relationship among this population changes. It could also be
the case that skeptics are simply unique regarding the interactions
between their religiosity or religious beliefs and conspiracy ideation, as
seen in our results wherein belief in human dominion trumps religiosity in
its relative effect on conspiracy ideation. Further research could tell us
why these effects occur.
A second possible explanation for our finding that religiosity is
positively associated with conspiracy ideation is that there are more
powerful spurious variables that impact the relationship between religiosity
and conspiracy ideation within our unique sample. While our analytical
models control for several additional predictors of conspiracy ideation –
political ideology, gender, age, race, and education – other potential
factors such as geographical location and economic status (not included in
our models due to multicollinearity), may be at play here. As such, our
work presents an opportunity for future research into the relationship
between religion and conspiracy ideation regarding climate change. We
also note that the effect size of religiosity on conspiracy ideation is
marginal but contend that this is substantively important given that our
model controls for other pertinent religious beliefs and demographic
variables.
Our finding that religious ideation is not significantly associated with
conspiracy ideation extends existing scholarship on this topic. Extant
research suggests that belief in conspiracies is only associated with
religious beliefs when they closely align (Oliver and Wood 2014). In the
case of climate skeptics, belief that climate change is a hoax is not directly
tied to ideas of end-times or God punishing humans and thus we do not
see an association between these beliefs.
While the magnitude of the statistically significant effect of belief in
human dominion is small, these findings are also substantively compelling.
It diverges a bit from Oliver and Wood’s contention that religious beliefs
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and conspiracy theories must align to be associated. Human dominion,
the belief that humans can dominate and control nature and/or are
superior to the natural world, is not directly associated with the perception
that climate change indicates the end-times, that it is punishment for sins,
nor that it is God’s will. As far as demographic measures are concerned,
our model for conspiracy ideation suggests that men and conservatives
are more likely to believe that climate change is a hoax, compared to
women and liberals, a finding that has been affirmed elsewhere in the
literature (Sarathchandra and Haltinner 2020).
Beyond conspiracy beliefs, our findings on pro-environmentalism
indicate that climate change skeptics behave in similar ways to the
general population with regards to environmentalism. We find that
religiosity is not associated with environmentalism, mirroring the work of
Boyd (1999) and reflecting the broader contradictory findings in the
literature. However, like Eckberg and Blocker’s (1996) and Guth et al.’s
(1995) studies among the general population, we find belief in human
dominion and religious ideation (including a belief that climate change
indicates the end-of-days) to be associated with a decrease in
environmentalism among skeptics.
Existing research does not examine the relationship between
emotions, religion, and climate change skepticism. Therefore, our findings
are important in future consideration of these intersections in social
science research.
Our findings differ from what is predicted in existing literature on
religiosity and emotions, outside of the realm of climate change. This
research suggests that increased church attendance is associated with
fewer fear-based emotions (Feifel and Nagy 1981). It may be the case that
for religious skeptics, emotional responses to climate change are already
mitigated by their disbelief.
The significant relationship with regards to religious ideation and
increased levels of dread, sadness, and grief is likely a result of the nature
of these beliefs. Our religious ideation variable measured the belief that
climate change is God’s will, that it indicates the end-of-days, and that it is
punishment for human sins. The fact that skeptics would feel dread,
sadness, and grief over these indicators is logical. Unfortunately, using
quantitative data, we cannot explain the causes of people’s expressed
dread, sadness, or grief. Therefore, it is possible that the positive
association between religious ideation and dread, sadness and grief aren’t
measuring fear of climate change nor sadness for a dying planet but,
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instead, are measuring fear and grief over what they believe to be an
impending Biblical apocalypse.
Similarly, our finding that belief in human dominion is negatively
associated with worry, dread, sadness and grief is also explained by the
nature of the population and belief structure itself. It makes sense that one
who perceives humans as ruling over earth would not experience negative
emotions over climate change.
Beyond religion, we see that – even within the population of
skeptics – age, political ideology, and gender are significantly connected
to emotional responses to climate change. Younger people, those who
identify as politically progressive, and women are more likely to feel
negative emotions associated with climate change as opposed to older
skeptics, political conservatives, and men. This suggests that the
population of climate skeptics – despite their skepticism – behave similarly
to the broader population regarding emotions. For example, people who
hold conservative ideology tend to hold more rigid understandings of
gender roles (Lye and Waldron 1997). Within this system, men are
expected to be stoic and express little emotion, especially related to fear
(Fischer 1993). Men, too, make up a disproportionate number of people
skeptical about climate change (McCright and Dunlap 2011). Therefore, it
is possible that some of the challenge in exploring emotions among
climate skepticism is a result of gendered expectations regarding
emotional performance.
Finally, our analysis demonstrates that our religion-based models
are better suited for understanding science distrust among skeptics, rather
than environmentalism. Prior research indicates surprisingly high levels of
environmental concern among climate change skeptics, while these
groups continue to question the science behind climate change (e.g.
Haltinner and Sarathchandra 2021b) which potentially explains some of
the variability in the above model fit statistics. Prior work also indicates
confounding effects of religion on environmentalism which may shed some
light on why our models better explain science distrust than
environmentalism. For example, Goldberg et al. (2019) found that
Christians express less skepticism of climate change when reminded of
Christian stewardship of the environment. These aspects require further
attention. Future research should also consider other potentially important
predictors and covariates such as religious sect, geography, and
economic factors.
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CONCLUSION
Our results present a nuanced look at the microcosm of climate change
skeptics and how their religious beliefs correspond with their levels of
conspiracy ideation, trust in science, environmentalism, and emotions
regarding climate change. Skeptics differ in important ways from the
broader public with regards to the relationship between religiosity/religious
ideation and conspiracy ideation. Yet, they behave in similar ways to the
general population with regards to religious ideation, religiosity and our
other outcome variables (trust in science, pro-environmentalism). There is
not enough existing research on the intersection of emotions, religion, and
climate change to evaluate the consistency of our findings vis-à-vis the
general American public.
On the question of whether religiosity or religious beliefs serve as a
better variable for analysis of climate change skepticism, we conclude that
religious ideation offers more robust scrutiny. While, in our study,
religiosity is a positive predictor of the belief that climate change is a hoax,
it is not associated with trust in science, pro-environmental concerns or
policy support, nor emotions related to climate change. In contrast,
religious beliefs (religious ideation and belief in human dominion) are
significant predictors of conspiracy ideation (human dominion is
associated with an increase in belief that climate change is a hoax); trust
in science (both religious ideation and belief in human dominion are
associated with greater distrust in science); pro-environmentalism (human
dominion is associated with lower levels of environmental concern; both
religious ideation and human dominion predict lower levels of support for
pro-environmental policy); and emotion (human dominion is associated
with lower levels of worry, dread, sadness, and grief while religious
ideation correlates with higher levels of dread, sadness and grief).
Of particular interest is our finding that skeptics behave differently
than the general population with relation to the ways that religion interacts
with conspiracy ideation. Existing research contends that religion is
associated with conspiracy ideation when the underlying ideologies are
associated. However, we find that belief in human dominion is associated
with the perspective that climate change is a hoax. The relationship
between dominion ideologies and conspiracy theories presents
opportunity for greater analysis.
Our work also shows the importance of considering the relationship
between emotion, religion, and belief about climate change. While there is
a rich intellectual tradition examining affect and perspectives on climate
change (see Environmental Humanities, especially Norgaard 2011; Wang
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et al. 2018; Stoknes 2015), it does not (yet) include an analysis of the way
that religion operates in this space.
Our research further suggests a need to reconceptualize the
relationship between religion and climate change skepticism. We find that
operationalizing religion as a unidimensional “frequency of religious
service attendance” measure is insufficient to capture the complex
relationship between religion and climate skepticism. Researchers should
pay close attention when conceptualizing and operationalizing predictors
of skepticism, particularly when targeting specific and unique populations.
While we found that religious ideation, including belief in human dominion,
matters more than religiosity for self-declared skeptics, it is plausible that a
different manifestation of religion works better as a predictor for other
unique sub-populations such as environmental activists or faith leaders.
Future research should consider other specific religious beliefs and unique
population sub-groups in their analyses.
Our survey sample suggests that greater investigation into religious
sect among climate skeptics as compared to the general population is also
warranted. According to the Pew Research Center (2019), 20 percent of
the American public is Catholic, yet only 12.6 percent of our sample
identifies as such. Further, they find that 43 percent identify as Protestant,
compared to our sample’s 37.2 percent. Instead, we find higher numbers
of religiously unaffiliated individuals (24.2 percent vs. a national level of 17
percent) and Latter-day Saints (4.4 percent vs. a national level of 1.6
percent; Haltinner and Sarathchandra 2020). Our atheist/agnostic
population is close to the national average at 9 percent (Table 2). Given
that white Catholics and white Protestants are disproportionately likely to
be skeptical of climate change (Pew Research Center 2015), we would
expect higher populations of these groups in our sample. This finding
warrants further examination including considerations of self-selection bias
in online survey research.
ENDNOTES
1

As a firm specializing in online surveys, Qualtrics aggregates data from certified panel

providers. These aggregate panels allow researchers to obtain representative samples
based on various sociodemographic factors of interest. However, Qualtrics samples are
not probability samples. As an aggregate survey panel, our sample was recruited by
Qualtrics via web portals, e-mails, and in-app notifications. Respondents were
compensated based on predetermined criteria such as length of survey and complexity of
acquiring a specific targeted population, as agreed between the panel providers and
individual respondents. As an additional quality control measure, we added a speeding
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check, i.e. median time to completion of 20 minutes (measured as one-third of the
median time taken to complete the survey in our pilot round). Those who did not meet
this speeding criterion were automatically removed from the final sample. For more
details on our survey and specific panel procedure, see Haltinner and Dilshani (2021b).
For more details on Qualtrics panel services, quality control, and validation methods, see
ESOMAR (2021).
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Supplementary Materials
Table SM1: Items Used in Environmental Concern Scale, N=1,000
Survey question: To what extent are you concerned about the following
situations? not at all concerned=1 to very concerned=7 (Cronbach’s
α=0.96)
Survey item
Mean
Standard deviation
Coral bleaching
4.22
1.78
Plastic in the ocean
5.15
1.75
Drought
4.43
1.75
Heat waves
4.04
1.76
Stronger forest fires
4.84
1.78
Sea level rising
4.07
1.80
Ica caps melting
4.08
1.86
The expanding territory of vector4.36
1.74
borne illnesses
Deforestation
4.77
1.76
Habitat destruction
4.76
1.73
Overpopulation
4.56
1.94
Air pollution
4.86
1.69
Animal species extinction
4.68
1.79
Monarch butterfly population loss
4.14
1.77
Bee population loss
4.93
1.81
Declining water quality
4.86
1.78
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Table SM2: Items Used in Pro-Environmental Policy Support Scale,
N=1,000
Survey question: To what degree do you support the following initiatives?
not at all=1 to a great deal=7 (Cronbach’s α=0.87)
Survey item
Mean
Standard deviation
Investment in solar panel farms
4.14
2.34
Investment in wind turbine farms
4.14
2.33
Tax rebates for consumers who
4.42
2.29
install renewable energy systems at
home
(Lack of) support for expanding
3.46
2.35
offshore drilling (recode)
Government regulations for fuel
3.81
2.27
efficiency standards in new cars
Federal regulations for air pollution
4.27
2.23
Federal regulations for water
4.54
2.30
pollution
(Lack of) support for Trump’s move
3.67
2.44
to cut funding to the EPA (recode)
(Lack of) support for Trump’s move
2.84
2.50
to leave the Paris Agreement
(recode)
Cap and trade initiatives to limit
2.96
2.29
CO2 production
Preservation of the National Parks
5.17
2.23
Public schools teaching about
4.08
2.25
environmental issues in the
classroom
Public schools teaching about
3.28
2.25
human caused climate change in
the classroom
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